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Initially, low-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa were 
hopeful of escaping the brunt of the global financial crisis because of the 
underdeveloped nature of their financial systems. The emerging evidence 
indicates, however, that they are experiencing a sharp downturn. So, how 
can policymakers in the region respond? This Development Viewpoint 
focuses on the options for counter-cyclical fiscal policies (see Weeks 2009). 
Historical evidence suggests that a one percentage point change in the 
growth of OECD countries is associated with a 0.42 percentage point 
change in the growth of countries in sub-Saharan Africa, with a one-year 
lag. Since there has been widespread recession in developed countries, 
the above correlation indicates that growth in sub-Saharan Africa could 
drop to about 3% in 2009 and 1% in 2010—from a previous peak of 6% in 
2007. 
In response to such a prospect, policymakers in Africa have two basic 
options. One, they could continue with pre-crisis ‘business-as-usual’ 
macroeconomic policies. These would continue the focus on preventing 
inflation, targeting small budget deficits and allowing flexibility of the 
exchange rate. Adopting this stance has to be based on the crucial 
assumption that the rich countries would soon resume robust rates of 
growth.
However, choosing such an option—as Dr Johnson said of second 
marriages—would represent the triumph of hope over experience. 
When the world economy is deflating (and full recovery is unlikely soon), 
implementing a fiscal policy guided by fears of inflation would result in 
a contraction of domestic demand, compounding the current severe 
contraction of exports.
In addition, targeting a small fiscal deficit is becoming increasingly 
difficult because of falling tax revenues. If the government attempts to 
correspondingly reduce public expenditures, domestic growth will decline 
even further. Moreover, if the central bank allows the nominal exchange 
rate to sharply depreciate (because of rising trade deficits), imports will 
become more expensive and thereby aggravate inflation.
Alternative Fiscal Policies
What is the alternative? Use counter-cyclical fiscal policies to compensate 
for the fall in domestic and external private demand. Though such 
Keynesianism has been out of fashion for some time, it has now suddenly 
come back into favour in the developed world. 
Multilateral and regional financial institutions, such as the IMF, World 
Bank and the African Development Bank, have begun endorsing 
counter-cyclical fiscal policies for the developing world. In January 
2009, for instance, the IMF called for a ‘firm commitment to a timely 
implementation of fiscal stimulus across a broad range of advanced and 
emerging economies’ and by May it had recommended such an approach, 
for the first time, for a low-income country, i.e., Mozambique. 
But how should developing countries in Africa implement such an 
approach? For example, which is better: lowering taxes or raising public 
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expenditures? Taxes are a clumsy instrument for demand management. 
First, approving new rates or instituting new taxes is likely to take time. 
There is also likely to be a higher multiplier impact for increasing public 
expenditures since savings from lower taxes might not be fully spent.
Generally, current expenditures are better suited than capital expenditures 
for counter-cyclical stimulus to an economy. Capital projects take more 
time to initiate (as well as more time to discontinue if an economy were 
to start over-heating). Capital expenditures are better suited to raising the 
growth potential of an economy whereas current expenditures are better 
suited to addressing shortfalls in demand that hold back realizing such a 
potential.
Exceptions to this rule are ‘labour-intensive public works’, which the 
International Labour Organisation has pioneered. Examples of such 
activities are repairing public buildings, digging sanitation ditches or 
clearing rural footpaths. Such temporary projects have low capital content, 
pay mostly wages and can be easily initiated and quickly terminated.
Financing Fiscal Deficits
If governments in sub-Saharan Africa run larger deficits as a result of 
implementing counter-cyclical fiscal policies, how can these be financed? 
One option is to press for greater donor support, building on the MDG 
consensus. But donor funding is not easily adapted to financing counter-
cyclical expenditures since it follows a fixed schedule of allocation and 
disbursement. 
An alternative is to encourage donors to set up an ‘aid fund’, whose monies, 
once established, could be drawn on quickly during a crisis. During periods 
of economic growth, in contrast, such monies could be built up.
However, as a practical matter, implementing a counter-cyclical fiscal 
stimulus in most countries in sub-Saharan Africa will have to be largely 
funded by domestic public-sector borrowing. If the associated deficit 
were to exceed a level consistent with other policy objectives, such as 
containing inflation, then donor funds should be sought to finance the 
shortfall.
Since economies in the region are operating well below full potential, 
there will be little danger that increases in public expenditures would 
crowd out private expenditures. In fact, deficit spending should stimulate 
more private spending. But how the deficit is financed might influence the 
impact on inflation.
In theory, the government could sell bonds to the private sector. There 
would be no effect on inflation since the net effect on the money supply 
would be zero. While the bond sale would siphon money out of the 
economy, the corresponding increase in public spending would inject the 
same amount back into it. 
But if the domestic bond market is shallow—as is often the case in low-
income countries—then the government might have to offer a high real 
rate of interest to buyers, which are usually domestic commercial banks. 
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The resultant rise in the borrowing rate of interest might deter private 
businesses from securing loans from these banks. 
So some ‘crowding out’ of productive private investment might indeed 
occur. And, in the process, the government would have to pay higher 
servicing costs for its public debt.
In contrast, borrowing money from the central bank, or ‘monetising 
the deficit’, can be an effective tool for expanding aggregate demand, 
without necessarily generating significant inflation or causing ‘crowding 
out’ of private expenditures (see chart). This assumes that the economy is 
operating below full capacity. 
Monetising the deficit would generate an increase in the money supply 
that should be sufficient to circulate the additional output of goods and 
services that results from the increase in public expenditures. Hence, there 
is no major technical argument against financing a fiscal stimulus through 
borrowing money from the central bank.
Exchange-Rate Management
When expansionary fiscal policies are used to combat recession, there will 
likely be pressures to depreciate a country’s exchange rate. The core reason 
is a likely expansion of a country’s trade deficit as the rise in incomes 
prompted by fiscal expansion is translated into higher imports.
The likelihood of such an outcome dictates that exchange-rate 
adjustments should be carefully managed. This stance contrasts with a 
regime of flexible exchange rates, in which the value of the currency is fully 
exposed to volatile market forces. Such a regime, though widely advocated 
by mainstream economists, is ill-suited for most low-income countries.
Without exchange-rate management, an abrupt and substantial 
depreciation would precipitate a potentially sharp rise in the domestic 
price level as imports become more expensive in domestic currency terms.
The purpose of maintaining a managed exchange-rate regime, such as 
a ‘managed float’ or a ‘crawling peg’, is not to eliminate depreciation but 
to control its rate and timing. The governing motivation is to prevent a 
country’s currency from depreciating at a rate that invites speculative 
attacks and ends up generating unacceptably strong inflationary 
pressures.
Summary
In sum, we are recommending that policymakers in sub-Saharan 
Africa implement counter-cyclical fiscal policies, based on maintaining 
complementary management of the exchange rate and securing financing 
mainly through borrowing from the central bank.
Such an approach will require, of course, some degree of flexibility on 
the part of donors and the International Monetary Fund, particularly with 
regard to the government’s inflation target. Obvious constraints are the 
magnitudes of any trade and fiscal deficits. 
Many governments are likely to need additional grant financing in order to 
effectively combat the threat of recession. But, more importantly, they will 
need to be granted additional ‘policy space’. This signifies that they should 
be relieved of abiding by unduly restrictive external conditionalities on 
public deficits and levels of inflation.
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